Hastings Law Journal
Volume 63 | Issue 3

Article 7

3-2012

Note – Exposing Misconduct: Fixing the California
Supreme Court’s Limitation of Post-Conviction
Discovery
Jasmine Berndt

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jasmine Berndt, Note – Exposing Misconduct: Fixing the California Supreme Court’s Limitation of Post-Conviction Discovery, 63 Hastings
L.J. 927 (2012).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol63/iss3/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

Berndt_63-HLJ-780 (Do Not Delete)

3/26/2012 5:39 PM

Exposing Misconduct:
Fixing the California Supreme Court’s
Limitation of Post-Conviction Discovery
Jasmine Berndt*
Following the Los Angeles Rampart Scandal, a concerned California legislature
created post-conviction procedures intended to help wrongfully convicted people
challenge convictions resulting from government misconduct. One of these
mechanisms was California Penal Code section 1054.9, which allowed defendantpetitioners attacking sentences of death or life without parole to discover evidence to
which they would have been entitled at trial upon a minimal showing. After years of
broadly interpreting the statute, the California Supreme Court reversed direction with
its decision in Barnett v. Superior Court, where it created a new hurdle for those
seeking discovery: Defendant-petitioners must now show a reasonable basis for
believing the requested discovery actually exists. This Note questions the bases for the
Barnett decision’s narrowing of post-conviction discovery and considers how this case
will affect defendant-petitioners’ ability to discover evidence of government misconduct
in the future. In order to better identify and present claims of government misconduct,
this Note looks to North Carolina’s open-file discovery statute as inspiration for new
California legislation.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012; B.A., University
of California, Berkeley, 2006. I would like to thank Kevin Bringuel for his early insights on this topic,
John Harrison for his unyielding moral support throughout the writing of this Note, and Howard
Seller for his swift and thoughtful editing. I would also like to thank my husband, Broc Stephens, for
keeping things interesting, and my mom, Nancy Berndt, for always easing the way.
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Introduction
In March 2011, San Francisco’s Public Defender, Jeff Adachi,
exposed a rash of police misconduct when he released surveillance
videotapes that showed plain-clothes police officers conducting illegal
1
drug searches in residential hotels. These tapes caused particular
outrage because they revealed significant inaccuracies in the officers’
2
incident reports and in-court testimony. According to the officers’ sworn
statements, they had made legal searches and seizures following the
3
applicable law, but the videos portrayed Fourth Amendment violations.
On March 2, 2011, San Francisco’s District Attorney and former
4
Police Chief, George Gascon, announced that his office would be

1. See Michael Cabanatuan, SF Officers Accused of Illegal Searches, Perjury, S.F. Chronicle,
Mar. 3, 2011, at A1; Dan McMenamin, Gascon Says DA’s Office Will Investigate Alleged Police
Misconduct Videos, SF Appeal (Mar. 2, 2011), http://sfappeal.com/news/2011/03/public-defenderreleases-videos-he-claims-show-police-misconduct.php.
2. See Cabanatuan, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Gascon, who had become Police Chief in August 2009, was appointed District Attorney by
Mayor Gavin Newsom in January 2011. Brent Begin, George Gascon’s Impartiality in Dealing with San
Francisco Police Tested, S.F. Examiner (Mar. 10, 2001, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/
local/2011/03/george-gascon-s-impartiality-dealing-san-francisco-police-tested.
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5

investigating the events. In less than a week, his office dropped sixtyeight pending cases involving the same police officers due to insufficient
6
evidence. Although Gascon disclaimed any conflict of interest based on
the fact that he had been the Police Chief at the time one of the videos
was shot, he eventually bowed to pressure and turned the investigation
7
over to the FBI.
The dismissed cases and ongoing FBI investigation demonstrate
what Adachi initially predicted: The police misconduct in the videos was
8
“clearly not an isolated case.” Adachi further pointed out that, “[i]t’s
9
just chance that [the Public Defender was] able to get the videos.”
Concerned about the rights of defendants whose convictions were based
on the work of the same police officers, Adachi sought to probe into
convictions going back seven years involving the eight identified
10
officers. To emphasize the need for this review, he noted the results of
his office’s recent investigation of the misconduct of a single San
11
Francisco Police Department criminalist in 2010. After the dismissal of
700 pending cases, the Public Defenders’ Office reviewed 1170 prior
12
convictions, 127 of which had sentences dismissed or reduced.
This situation raises a number of pressing questions: How significant
an issue is misconduct by government officers engaged in law
enforcement? Do criminal defendants have a fair chance to unearth such
misconduct at trial? When the public trusts government officials to
pursue justice and public safety, how can defendants identify and prove
government misconduct?
Presumably, California was asking these and similar questions in the
late 1990s when news of the Rampart Scandal shocked the state. The
Rampart Scandal involved widespread misconduct by officers in an
13
antigang unit within the Los Angeles Police Department. State
investigators found that the officers had engaged in a continuous system

5. See Cabanatuan, supra note 1.
6. Ari Burack, Nearly 70 Cases Dropped by San Francisco DA’s Office in Police Misconduct
Investigation, S.F. Examiner (Mar. 15, 2001, 9:01 AM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/crime/2011/03/
nearly-70-cases-dropped-san-francisco-da-s-office-police-misconduct-investigatio.
7. Ari Burack, San Francisco’s Criminal-Case Dismissals Might Slow Down, S.F. Examiner
(Mar. 15, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/crime/2011/03/san-franciscos-criminal-casedismissals-might-slow-down.
8. McMenamin, supra note 1.
9. Id.
10. Burack, supra note 7.
11. Id. The San Francisco District Attorney’s Office evidently was aware that the criminalist’s
work was “jeopardizing” cases, but failed to alert defense attorneys. See Jaxon Van Derbeken, Harris
Turns Drug Lab Scandal over to State, S.F. Chronicle, Apr. 24, 2010, at A1; Jaxon Van Derbeken,
Harris’ Top Aide Retiring—Sat on Scandal Tip, S.F. Chronicle, June 12, 2010, at A1.
12. Burack, supra note 7.
13. Matt Lait & Scott Glover, Rampart Case Takes on Momentum of Its Own, L.A. Times (Dec.
31, 1999), http://articles.latimes.com/print/1999/dec/31/news/mn-49335.
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of misconduct, using planted evidence, false testimony, and other abuses
14
of power to arrest and convict people. This scandal raised questions
about a huge number of past and pending criminal cases, and the District
Attorney’s ability to address all of the related cases was questionable at
15
best.
The California state legislature responded to the Rampart Scandal
with Senate Bill 1391. The bill was intended to “create[] a process for a
convicted person, whether or not in custody, to vacate a judgment based
16
on fraud or the presentation of false evidence by the government.” One
part of that bill created section 1054.9 of the California Penal Code,
which established a statutory system of post-conviction discovery for
prisoners pursuing collateral challenges to sentences of death or life
17
without the possibility of parole. The plain language of the statute
instructs courts to grant a defendant-petitioner discovery of all materials
to which he would have been entitled at trial, upon a showing that good
faith attempts to retrieve the same materials from his own trial counsel
18
were unsuccessful. Though it did not reach all potential convictions
based on government misconduct, the statute gave defendant-petitioners
facing the most serious sentences access to materials to support habeas
19
20
claims involving the conduct of police officers, prosecutors, and
21
defense counsel.
22
After many years of broad interpretation of section 1054.9, the
prognosis for state post-conviction discovery changed dramatically in
August 2010, when the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
23
Barnett v. Superior Court. In Barnett, the court announced that
defendant-petitioners seeking to obtain discovery beyond what was
already provided at trial “must show a reasonable basis to believe that
24
specific requested materials actually exist.” While this “reasonable

14. Id.
15. See Henry Weinstein, Rampart Probe May Now Affect Over 3,000 Cases, L.A. Times (Dec. 15,
1999), http://articles.latimes.com/print/1999/dec/15/news/mn-44050.
16. Assemb. Comm. on Pub. Safety, Public Safety 2002: Creating a Safer California 104 (2002).
17. Act of Sept. 29, 2002, ch. 1105, § 1, 2002 Cal. Stat. 7100, 7100–01.
18. Cal. Penal Code § 1054.9(a)–(b) (2011).
19. At trial, defendants who file a specific motion are entitled to evidence of police misconduct
from officers’ personnel files under certain circumstances. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1043–1047 (2011).
20. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence
is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.”); see also Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959) (“[T]he district attorney has the
responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the truth.” (citing People v.
Savvides, 154 N.Y.S. 2d 885, 887 (N.Y. 1956))).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 130–31.
22. In re Steele, 85 P.3d 444, 451 (Cal. 2004).
23. 237 P.3d 980 (Cal. 2010).
24. Id. at 981.
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basis” language seems innocuous, in reality it means that the most
egregious cases of government misconduct will continue undetected.
Because materials that were not disclosed at trial are by their nature
hidden from the defense, the likelihood of a defendant-petitioner
producing evidence that such items actually exists is a matter of luck.
This Note argues that the Barnett court got it wrong when it stated
that the purpose of section 1054.9 was only “to allow defendants to
25
receive materials they have reason to believe they are missing.” This
position disregards the historical context that led to Senate Bill 1391, the
plain language of the statute, and the demonstrable legislative intent
that, using section 1054.9, defendant-petitioners should be able to access
any material to which they would have been entitled at trial simply by
showing that the same evidence could not be obtained from trial counsel.
The Barnett decision significantly narrows the reach of discovery
requests under section 1054.9 and has the potential to undermine its use
in the very situations it was intended to address.
This Note is divided into four parts. Part I traces the history of postconviction discovery in California, from the judicially created rule that
preceded the statutory scheme, through section 1054.9’s creation and
26
early interpretation to the Barnett decision. Part II critically analyzes
the Barnett court’s stated justifications for creating the reasonable-basis
requirement and explains why each lacks merit. Part III describes how
the Barnett decision could impact each of three categories of discovery
requests: specific document identification, pattern and practice, and
preexisting duty. Finally, Part IV looks to North Carolina’s open-file
discovery statute as inspiration for new California legislation to preserve
habeas petitioners’ ability to access evidence of government misconduct
for post-conviction challenges.

I. Historical Background
The last decade has seen rapid changes in California’s system of
post-conviction discovery. The first major case to interpret section 1054.9
specified the types of discovery request included within the plain
language of the statute but did not limit its scope. Just six years later, the
California Supreme Court narrowed the application of the statute by
imposing a “reasonable basis” requirement that will prevent discovery in
some of the very situations for which it was intended.

25. Id. at 985.
26. Catlin v. Superior Court, 245 P.3d 860 (Cal. 2011), decided after Barnett, addressed the
question of time limits for section 1054.9 discovery motions.
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A. Section 1054.9 of the California Penal Code
Prior to 2002, California lacked a statute governing post-conviction
27
discovery. Instead, courts addressed discovery requests on a case-by28
29
case basis, and People v. Gonzalez governed.
Gonzalez concerned a habeas petitioner’s right to receive discovery
in the face of breaking news of a ten-year “conspiracy to suborn perjury
30
involving the police, prosecutors and informants.” Eight years after
Gonzalez’s conviction, a scandal erupted involving the use of jailhouse
31
informants known to be unreliable by the District Attorney’s Office.
When Gonzalez learned that this practice overlapped with his own case,
he filed a motion seeking discovery of the prosecution’s files on the
32
jailhouse informant who had testified against him. Though he did not
know whether the informant in his case was involved in the scandal,
Gonzalez claimed that the scandal cast a doubt on the informant’s
veracity and that the materials were necessary to attack his conviction on
33
34
habeas. The trial court ordered the requested discovery.
On appeal, the California Supreme Court found that because there
was no longer any proceeding in the case before the trial court, the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case and therefore no authority “to
35
order ‘free-floating’ post-judgment discovery.” It went on to explain
36
that pretrial discovery rights did not extend post-conviction. The court
stated that unless a defendant-petitioner states a prima facie claim, which
the court would be required to grant if true, there is no jurisdiction for
37
even the California Supreme Court to order discovery. Because
Gonzalez had not made a prima facie case that the informant who
testified against him had given false testimony or that the prosecutor had
withheld evidence of the same, the court would not order discovery in his
38
case. The court rejected the defendant-petitioner’s argument that this
created a “Catch-22” that required him to prove his claim in order for

27. Cal. S. Rules Comm., Bill Analysis, S. 2002-1391, 2002 Sess., at 2.
28. See id. at 5.
29. Id. (discussing People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159 (Cal. 1990)).
30. People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1203 (Cal. 1990); see Ted Rohrlich, Scandal over Jail
Informants Forces Retrial, L.A. Times, Dec. 16, 1989, at 1; see also Ted Rohrlich, Man Fingered by
Informant to Be Freed, L.A. Times, Apr. 5, 1991, at 3 (describing informant scandal); Ted Rohrlich,
Perjurer Sentenced to 3 Years, L.A. Times, May 20, 1992, at 1 (stating that despite their suspected
involvement, no law-enforcement agents were convicted in the scandal because it was impossible to
prove).
31. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d at 1203.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1204.
37. Id. at 1205.
38. Id.
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the court to grant discovery of the evidence needed to prove his claim.
Because the defendant-petitioner had no presumption of innocence and
no right to post-conviction discovery, the court concluded that “[t]he
state may properly require that a defendant obtain some concrete
information on his own before he invokes collateral remedies against a
40
final judgment.” The court found that the prosecution’s knowledge of a
merely potential scandal and their failure to investigate it did not require
post-judicial intervention. It reasoned that the defendant-petitioner had
not provided the requisite independent, concrete information that the
41
informant in his case had given false testimony.
Another scandal compromising the criminal justice system erupted
in the Rampart Division of the Los Angeles Police Department in 1999.
When prosecutors charged former police officer Rafael Perez for theft of
cocaine from the department’s evidence locker, Perez offered to make a
42
deal with state investigators. He agreed to testify in state court about
the corruption he witnessed in the department in exchange for favorable
43
treatment. His subsequent confession opened a Pandora’s box of police
misconduct. As investigators corroborated Perez’s testimony, they
learned that it implicated seventy police officers in a range of misconduct
including illegal shootings and beatings, planting evidence, committing
44
perjury, selling drugs, and intimidating witnesses. Courts threw out
many pending cases, and attorneys challenged previously obtained
45
convictions.
The Rampart Scandal revealed shortcomings in the legal system’s
readiness to unearth and address law-enforcement misconduct.
Wrongdoing and poor performance reached beyond the police
department to prosecutors and defense attorneys. As the evidence of
police misconduct came to light, prosecutors were less than forthcoming
about the progression of the investigation and the number of affected
cases. Though the District Attorney’s Office knew people had been
falsely convicted, it began reopening cases only after the police
46
department threatened to go to the press with the story.
Representatives from the District Attorney’s Office misled the public
47
about the number of police officers implicated in the scandal. The
scandal even revealed defense counsel misconduct: In a civil lawsuit, a

39. Id.
40. Id. at 1206.
41. Id.
42. See Lait & Glover, supra note 13.
43. Id.
44. Steve Berry et al., D.A. Says No New Charges Expected in Rampart Probe, L.A. Times, Nov.
8, 2001, at 1.
45. Id.
46. See Lait & Glover, supra note 13.
47. Scott Glover & Matt Lait, Transcripts on Rampart Belie D.A., L.A. Times, Mar. 1, 2003, at 1.
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jury found the public defender who represented a victim of the scandal
negligent for failing to uncover the police misconduct that led to the
48
victim’s wrongful conviction.
In response, in 2002 Senator John Burton introduced Senate Bill
1391, a three-part bill designed to correct the post-conviction system’s
inability to provide meaningful review for prisoners who had been
49
victims of government misconduct. The purpose of the bill was “to
provide a reasonable avenue for habeas counsel to obtain documents to
50
which trial counsel was already legally entitled.” For purposes of this
Note, the most relevant provision of the bill was the addition of section
1054.9 to the California Penal Code, which permitted and regulated postconviction discovery for defendants filing writs of habeas corpus or
51
motions to vacate judgment. Specifically, the law provides that courts
shall grant discovery after the defendant-petitioner shows an
unsuccessful, good faith effort to get discovery materials from his trial
52
counsel. “Discovery materials” for purposes of this provision are all
materials (except DNA and other physical evidence) to which the
53
defendant would have been entitled at trial.
Senate Bill 1391 has two major provisions besides 1054.9 that are
significant to an understanding of the legislature’s purpose. First, the bill
created a right for someone who discovers new evidence of police
misconduct after his incarceration ends to challenge his conviction within
54
a year of the discovery. The Legislative Counsel’s Digest explained that
this was necessary because defendants had no recourse to challenge their
convictions if evidence of government misconduct came to light only
55
after they had served their sentences. As a result, they could not use this
new evidence of innocence to clear their names and to ameliorate the
56
collateral effects of the conviction. Second, the bill removed the sunset
provision then in place on California Penal Code section 1417.9, which
57
governs the preservation and destruction of DNA evidence. This
change ensured that a system for the preservation of DNA used to
convict people of crimes would remain in place.

48. Police officers shot and paralyzed an unarmed man before planting an assault rifle on him.
Andrew Blankstein, Jury Awards $6.5 Million in Frame-Up, L.A. Times, May 26, 2005, at 3.
49. Act of Sept. 29, 2002, ch. 1105, 2002 Cal. Stat. 7100.
50. Cal. S. Rules Comm., Bill Analysis, S. 2002-1391, 2002 Sess., at 5.
51. Cal. Penal Code § 1054.9(a)–(b) (2011).
52. Id. § 1054.9(a).
53. Id. § 1054.9(b). Section 1054.9 reserves different procedures for the examination of physical
evidence and DNA evidence, which are not within the scope of this Note. Id. § 1054.9(c).
54. § 3, 2002 Cal. Stat. 7100, 7102 (codified as amended at Cal. Penal Code § 1473.6 (2011)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. § 2.
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The legislative history of Senate Bill 1391 shows that proponents of
section 1054.9 focused their argument on the problem of defendants
58
whose trial files were lost or destroyed. Under Gonzalez, defendantpetitioners were required to make a prima facie case for relief in order to
obtain replacements of discovery to which they would have been entitled
59
at trial. But defendant-petitioners could not meet that requirement
because the very evidence they needed to present could be found only by
60
means of the requested discovery. Though simple file reconstruction
was clearly one legislative prerogative, when considered in the context of
the Senate Bill as a whole, it seems that the file-reconstruction argument
was meant to illustrate how “woefully inadequate” the Gonzalez rule
61
was, rather than to limit the reach of section 1054.9.
62
Further, the historical context discussed above, a statement made
by the Governor, and the House Committee on Public Safety’s statement
in its 2002 report of legislation all depict section 1054.9 as one part of a
broad effort to confront government misconduct. When he signed Senate
Bill 1391 into law, Governor Gray Davis described, in a letter to the
Senate, his position and some of the background that went into the bill’s
creation:
As Governor, I strongly support the hard working men and women of
law enforcement. However, nobody is above the law and in the rare
cases where governmental officials deceive the Courts, there must be
appropriate remedies.
This legislation was introduced in the wake of the Rampart cases in
which numerous felons were released from prison because their
conviction depended heavily on testimony from law enforcement that
subsequently turned out to be false. Thus, the provisions of this bill
were worked out after extensive discussions with the Los Angeles
District Attorney, the Attorney General, California District Attorney’s
63
Association and the California Public Defender’s Association.

Similarly, the Assembly Committee on Public Safety issued a report
64
in which it discussed the purpose of the bill. Senate Bill 1391 is
discussed in this report under the title “Government Misconduct: Motion
65
to Vacate Judgment.” After briefly explaining the inadequate legal
procedures available to convicted prisoners seeking to prove innocence
in the face of government misconduct such as the Rampart Scandal, the
report summarized the bill as “creat[ing] a process for a convicted

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Cal. S. Rules Comm., Bill Analysis, S. 2002-1391, 2002 Sess., at 4.
People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1205 (Cal. 1990).
Cal. S. Rules Comm., Bill Analysis, S. 2002-1391, 2002 Sess., at 5.
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 27–48.
S. Journal, 2001–2002 Reg. Sess., at 6211 (Cal. 2002).
Assemb. Comm. on Public Safety, supra note 16, at 104.
Id.
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person, whether or not in custody, to vacate a judgment based on fraud
66
or the presentation of false evidence by the government.” It then
paraphrased the different components of the bill, including the
67
provisions of 1054.9.
B. IN RE STEELE
The California Supreme Court first described the scope of section
68
1054.9 in the case of In re Steele. The defendant-petitioner in Steele filed
a motion pursuant to section 1054.9 directly in the Supreme Court,
asking the court to order the prosecutor and law-enforcement authorities
in his case to provide him with any materials they possessed pertaining to
69
his cooperation with prison officials during a prior incarceration. The
defendant-petitioner knew only that the prosecution had some records
pertaining to his prior incarceration, but did not know whether they
70
actually possessed any records responsive to the request. The Attorney
General claimed that the requested records were outside the scope of the
71
statute. Because this was the court’s first opportunity to apply 1054.9, it
analyzed the statutory text and legislative history to instruct future lower
courts in making determinations regarding the proper scope of the
72
statute. The court found that both the plain language of the statute and
the legislative history indicated that section 1054.9 applied to four
categories of materials. The court summarized:
Accordingly, we interpret section 1054.9 to require the trial court,
on a proper showing of a good faith effort to obtain the materials from
trial counsel, to order discovery of specific materials currently in the
possession of the prosecution or law enforcement authorities involved
in the investigation or prosecution of the case that the defendant can
show either (1) the prosecution did provide at time of trial but have
since become lost to the defendant; (2) the prosecution should have
provided at time of trial because they came within the scope of a
discovery order the trial court actually issued at that time, a statutory
duty to provide discovery, or the constitutional duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence; (3) the prosecution should have provided at time
of trial because the defense specifically requested them at that time
and was entitled to receive them; or (4) the prosecution had no

66. Id.
67. Id. at 104–05; see supra text accompanying notes 52–57.
68. 85 P.3d 444 (Cal. 2004).
69. Id. at 447–48.
70. Id. at 448.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 450 (stating that, while the court could dismiss the motion without prejudice, instead it
would consider the merits in order to provide guidance to future courts addressing such motions). The
court also articulated the procedure for section 1054.9 motions because the statute did not specifically
describe one. Id. at 449–50 (explaining that petitioners should first attempt to arrange for permissible
discovery informally and then, in the case of conflicts, the defendant generally should file a section
1054.9 motion in the trial court of his conviction).
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obligation to provide at time of trial absent a specific defense request,
but to which the defendant would have been entitled at time of trial
73
had the defendant specifically requested them.

Of the four categories of discoverable evidence described in Steele,
only the first describes file reconstruction, while the remaining three
refer to material that the defendant-petitioner never received in the first
place, though he was, or would have been, entitled to it. The court then
found that Steele’s request fell into the fourth category described above
because it dealt with information that would not necessarily be
74
considered exculpatory by the prosecutor. However, if defense counsel
had requested this information in support of a mitigation theory at trial,
the prosecutor would have been on notice of its exculpatory nature and
75
been obligated to provide it.
The court also reviewed the language of the request made in Steele
76
and found it “reasonably specific.” The request asked for:
Any and all reports, memoranda, notes, tape recordings, statements,
transcripts, confidential files, debriefing documents, and/or summaries
documenting or referring to petitioner’s leaving the Nuestra Familia; to
information provided by petitioner regarding the Nuestra Familia, its
members and associates, and non-member collaborators; and to
assistance provided by petitioner in prosecutions pursued by the State
of California and/or local prosecutors against the Nuestra Familia and
others accused of collaborating with the Nuestra Familia in the
77
commission of crimes.

Although the defendant-petitioner did not identify specific
documents or prove that such documents existed, the court described the
request as a “focused request for specific information . . . . within the
78
scope of section 1054.9.” As a result, the court remanded the case to the
79
lower court, ordering discovery of the requested records.
C. BARNETT V. SUPERIOR COURT
In the summer of 2010, in Barnett v. Superior Court the California
Supreme Court changed the scope of discovery materials that habeas
80
petitioners in California courts can seek under section 1054.9. The
Barnett court reviewed the lower court’s ruling that a defendantpetitioner seeking post-conviction discovery was not required to show

73. Id. at 453.
74. Id. at 456.
75. The court found it insignificant that the record was unclear whether the material had, in fact,
been requested at trial. Id.
76. Id. at 457.
77. Id. at 447–48.
78. Id. at 457.
79. Id.
80. 237 P.3d 980 (Cal. 2010).
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81

that the requested materials actually existed. Because Barnett involved
twenty-four different discovery requests of varying specificity, the court
82
addressed the issue abstractly. It held that because the main goal of the
legislature when creating section 1054.9 was file reconstruction, and
because the statute was meant to be an efficient tool, “defendants must
show they have a reasonable basis to believe that the specific materials
they seek actually exist” in order to receive discovery beyond file
83
reconstruction.
The exact contours of the reasonable-basis requirement were not
outlined in the decision. The California Supreme Court’s response to the
lower court’s reasoning for refusing to require the reasonable-basis
standard suggests how the California Supreme Court might interpret the
84
standard in the future. The California Court of Appeal had found that
the standard would be virtually impossible for defendant-petitioners to
85
meet. The California Supreme Court conceded that would be true if the
purpose of the statute were to allow a defendant-petitioner to discover
“any material that might exist,” but asserted instead that the purpose of
the statute was to permit defendant-petitioners to discover “materials
86
they have reason to believe they are missing.” The court then listed a
number of circumstances where evidence would allow defendantpetitioners to meet the reasonable-basis requirement: references in
witness testimony, documents already possessed by the defense, or
evidence in the trial transcripts of specific documents that the defense
87
was never provided. If these examples define the scope of discovery,
then Barnett imposes a higher threshold than that stated in the plain
language of section 1054.9 and in the court’s earlier interpretation in
Steele.

II. The BARNETT Court’s Misreading of the Meaning and
Purpose of Section 1054.9
Although the language of section 1054.9 of the California Penal
Code is clear on the issues of scope and the defendant-petitioner’s
threshold showing, the Barnett court relied instead on its earlier
decisions, legislative history, and the evidence code to ascertain a
legislative purpose contradictory to the plain language. Because the plain
language of section 1054.9 clearly requires a defendant-petitioner to
show nothing more than that good faith efforts to obtain materials from

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 982.
Id.
Id. at 986.
Id. at 984–85.
Id.
Id. at 985.
Id. at 984–85.
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trial counsel were unsuccessful, the Barnett court never should have
considered legislative intent. However, if the court was determined to
look at more than just the statute’s plain meaning, then it should have
considered the historical context and legislative materials indicating that
the legislature intended the statute to have a broad reach.
A. Disregarding the Plain Meaning
The plain language a statute is regarded as the first indication of the
88
legislature’s intent. If the language of the statute is clear, the courts
89
should refrain from engaging in statutory construction. Section 1054.9
states in relevant part:
(a) Upon the prosecution of a postconviction writ of habeas corpus
or a motion to vacate a judgment in a case in which a sentence of death
or of life in prison without the possibility of parole has been imposed,
and on a showing that good faith efforts to obtain discovery materials
from trial counsel were made and were unsuccessful, the court shall,
except as provided in subdivision (c) [relating to physical evidence],
order that the defendant be provided reasonable access to any of the
materials described in subdivision (b).
(b) For purposes of this section, “discovery materials” means
materials in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement
authorities to which the same defendant would have been entitled at
90
time of trial.

When the court in Steele analyzed the statutory language with
91
regard to scope, the court found that language unambiguous. It rejected
the Attorney General’s assertion that the statute was intended as a filereconstruction statute and explained, “The plain language here does not
limit the discovery materials to materials the defense once actually
possessed to the exclusion of materials the defense did not possess but to
92
which it would have been entitled at time of trial.” The court
specifically noted that the legislature used the words “would have been
93
94
entitled to at time of trial” rather than “actually possessed.” As a
result, the court described all of the categories of evidence that fell within
95
the statute’s scope.
Section 1054.9 is similarly clear with regard to the showing required
when requesting discovery. Specifically, the statute states that courts
shall order discovery to defendant-petitioners “on a showing that good

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

In re Steele, 85 P.3d 444, 450 (Cal. 2004) (quoting People v. Statum, 50 P.3d 355, 359 (Cal. 2002)).
People v. Statum, 50 P.3d 355, 359 (Cal. 2002).
Barnett, 237 P.3d at 983 (alteration in original) (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 1054.9 (2011)).
85 P.3d at 451.
Id.
Id. at 450 (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 1054.9).
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 73.
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faith efforts to obtain discovery materials from trial counsel were made
96
and were unsuccessful.” The statute requires nothing more and makes
no distinction between the showing required for discovery to replace
documents that were already provided at trial (file reconstruction) and
discovery that the defendant-petitioner never received. The legislature
could have, but did not, impose different or additional requirements for
requests of material beyond file reconstruction. For instance, the
legislature could have insisted that in order to obtain materials beyond
file reconstruction, the defendant-petitioner must show an evidentiary
basis for believing the materials actually exist, along with the stated
showing that the discovery could not be obtained from trial counsel. Its
decision not to do so indicates that it intended no such limitation.
The Barnett court should have noted the statute’s clarity on scope
and threshold showing and stopped its analysis there. Despite the fact
that the court previously had found the statutory language clear as to the
scope of section 1054.9 and applied it to each of the four evidence
97
categories in Steele, in Barnett it asserted that the statute had a narrower
98
scope. It said that the scope of discovery was no longer the materials
that the defendant-petitioner “would have been entitled to at trial,” but
99
only those “materials they have reason to believe they are missing.” The
court added the related threshold showing, requiring defendantpetitioners to present a reasonable basis for their belief that discovery
100
documents exist. As Justice Werdegar noted in her dissenting opinion,
the court’s “interpretation of the post-conviction discovery statute
(§ 1054.9), lack[ed] any basis in the statute’s language, [and was] wholly
101
illegitimate.”
B. The BARNETT Court’s Arguments for the Reasonable-Basis
Requirement
Instead of resting on the previously interpreted plain meaning of the
statute, the court embarked on the project of discerning legislative intent.
However, it failed to identify any expression of the legislature that would
support its finding regarding intent. The court misapplied its own
precedent and used the legislature’s desire for efficiency to craft its
labored claim that section 1054.9 “requires defendants who seek discovery
beyond file reconstruction to show a reasonable basis to believe that other
102
specific materials actually exist.” The court considered four different

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Cal. Penal Code § 1054.9.
See supra text accompanying note 73.
Barnett v. Superior Court, 237 P.3d 983, 985 (Cal. 2010).
Id. at 985.
Id. at 986.
Id. at 990 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
Id. at 984 (majority opinion).
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pieces of information before coming to this summary conclusion. Upon
examination, not a single one of these points suggests that the legislature
intended for the court to rule as it did.
First, the court framed its discussion by noting the limits on section
1054.9 recognized in Steele. It suggested that the scope of discovery
should be circumscribed, stating that the statute permits only “limited
103
discovery,” not “free floating” discovery requests. While these phrases
appear to support the court’s position when read on their own, their
original contexts reveal the very specific meaning these phrases were first
used to convey. When the Steele court used these phrases to describe the
scope of section 1054.9, it was not to narrow the plain language of the
statute, but merely to identify the limits that were evident on its face. It
explained that the statute does not permit “‘free floating’ discovery
104
asking for virtually anything the prosecution possesses”; instead, it
applies exclusively to materials that the prosecution and lawenforcement agencies currently possess and to which the defendant105
petitioner was entitled at trial and does not currently possess. The term
“free floating” was taken from Gonzalez, where the court used the term
to refer to discovery requests made to a court that has no jurisdiction
106
over a case.
Next, the court discussed the repeated use of the word “specific” in
Steele to describe certain categories of evidence to which a defendant107
petitioner is entitled (beyond file reconstruction). The court gave one
such example of its use of the word “specific”: “[W]e said the obtainable
discovery ‘includes specific materials that the defendant can show the
prosecution should have provided (but did not provide) at the time of
108
trial . . . .’” With this, the court suggested that Steele referred to the
defendant-petitioner’s need to identify specific documents. In fact,
though the Steele court repeatedly used the word “specific,” it did so to
convey a meaning different from the one implied in Barnett. Steele
referred to a defendant-petitioner’s need to describe with specificity in
the discovery request the kind of materials sought so as to make clear
109
what material is sought and why it must be provided. Thus, the court
explained that the prosecution would have been obligated to provide
evidence that Steele informed on a prison gang after the defense made a

103.
104.
1990)).
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
In re Steele, 85 P.3d 444, 451 (Cal. 2004) (citing People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1203 (Cal.
Id.
People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1203 (Cal. 1990).
Barnett, 237 P.3d at 984.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Steele, 85 P.3d at 451).
85 P.3d at 452–57.
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specific request for that material, thereby identifying such information as
110
mitigating.
The facts of Steele clearly demonstrate that the case did not impose
a requirement on defendant-petitioners to show that specific evidence
111
exists. The court considered Steele’s discovery request for documents
relating to the defendant-petitioner’s leaving, informing on, and assisting
112
in the investigation and prosecution of a prison gang. It determined
that, because the evidence supported the defense’s mitigation theory, the
requested material fell in the category of evidence to which the
defendant-petitioner would have been entitled at trial had he made a
specific request, but the exculpatory value would not have been evident
113
to the prosecutor. The court determined that the wording of Steele’s
request met the specificity requirement and was “a focused request for
114
specific information.” Thus, the specificity required is not a showing
that a specific document exists, but that the request describes the specific
type of information sought.
The court’s third offer in support of the reasonable-basis
requirement was the mention in Steele that a defendant-petitioner
requesting discovery must overcome the presumption under section 664
115
of the California Evidence Code that an official duty has been regularly
116
performed. However, the presumption provided by the Evidence Code
117
affects burden of proof and is not relevant in discovery proceedings.
Each of the cases cited to support the government’s position involved the
burden of proof for elements of substantive legal claims where the
118
prosecutor’s actions were at issue. Unlike those substantive elements,
110. Id. at 456–57.
111. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Habeas Corpus Resource Center in Partial Support of Both
Parties and Otherwise in Support of Petitioner Lee Max Barnett at 31–32, Barnett, 237 P.3d 980 (No.
S165522), 2009 CA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1268, at *56–57 [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae Habeas
Corpus Resource Center].
112. Steele, 85 P.3d at 447–48.
113. Id. at 456.
114. Id. at 457.
115. Cal. Evid. Code § 664 (2011) (“It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed.”).
116. Barnett, 237 P.3d at 984.
117. Cal. Evid. Code § 660 (2011); see also Application of California Public Defenders’
Association for Leave to File Brief of Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Petitioner Lee Max Barnett, Brief
of Amicus Curiae at 8, Barnett, 237 P.3d 980 (No. S165522), 2009 CA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1269, at *6
[hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae California Public Defenders’ Ass’n].
118. See Petition for Review at 21, Barnett, 237 P.3d 980 (No. S150229), 2007 CA S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 3236, at 35–36. (citing People v. Superior Court, 47 P.2d 724, 729–30 (Cal. 1935), Miller v.
Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591, 606 (Ct. App. 2002), and People v. Cummings, 296 P.2d 610, 615
(Cal. Ct. App. 1956)). But see People v. Superior Court, 47 P.2d at 729–30 (holding that, in a case to set
aside an order vacating judgment, the state did not have to prove that the prosecutor performed his
duty because of the evidentiary presumption); Miller, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606 (“Where a criminal
defendant raises official misconduct as a defense, he or she bears the burden of proof on this issue.”);
Cummings, 296 P.2d at 615 (stating that in an appeal from a criminal conviction and absent evidence of
bad faith in cross examination, courts presume the prosecutor acted in good faith).
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section 1054.9 does not require defendant-petitioners to show anything at
all about the prosecutor. The statute merely requires a showing that the
defendant-petitioner made a good faith attempt to obtain the discovery
from his own trial counsel. Furthermore, Steele only alluded to the
presumption under the Evidence Code in dicta, after dismissing the
Attorney General’s argument that section 664 limited the scope of
119
discovery. In so doing, it cited Gonzalez, which the legislature explicitly
120
rejected when it created a replacement post-conviction scheme. The
legislature created section 1054.9 from whole cloth with only one
threshold barrier to discovery: that the defendant-petitioner made a good
faith effort to first obtain from trial counsel any evidence to which he was
121
entitled at trial.
Assuming arguendo that Evidence Code section 664 is relevant to
discovery requests under section 1054.9, application of Barnett’s
reasonable-basis requirement to all post-conviction discovery requests is
overbroad. Steele specifically stated that section 1054.9 gave defendantpetitioners access to evidence that would have been available only upon
request at trial, even if no such request was made (the fourth category of
122
discoverable evidence described in Steele). For example, a criminal
defendant is not automatically entitled to the prosecution’s evidence that
the defendant was exposed to toxic chemicals as an infant or toddler
unless the defense attorney makes a request that would put the
prosecutor on notice that such evidence is material to a defense
mitigation theory. A defendant-petitioner who requests this evidence for
the first time post-conviction does so without suggesting that the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct. Despite the inapplicability of section
664 of the Evidence Code in such circumstances, the Barnett decision
imposed the reasonable-basis requirement on evidence that the
prosecution never had a prior duty to provide, just as it did on those
categories that imply misconduct.
Finally, the Barnett court was wrong in stating that file
reconstruction was the legislature’s primary concern in passing the
123
statute. There is no doubt that one goal the legislature sought to
achieve through the implementation of section 1054.9 was simplified file
reconstruction. Proponents of the bill explained to the legislature the
injustice that befell defendant-petitioners whose trial files were lost or
124
destroyed under the preexisting Gonzalez scheme. However, the court
in Steele acknowledged that both the plain text of the statute and the

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

85 P.3d at 451.
Cal. S. Rules Comm., Bill Analysis, S. 2002-1391, 2002 Sess., at 5.
Cal. Penal Code § 1054.9 (2011).
See supra text accompanying notes 73–74.
Barnett v. Superior Court, 237 P.3d 983, 984 (Cal. 2010).
Cal. S. Rules Comm., Bill Analysis, S. 2002-1391, 2002 Sess., at 5.
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legislative history indicated that section 1054.9 served a purpose much
125
“broader than mere file reconstruction.” In the legislature’s own words,
“The purpose of the proposed legislation is to provide a reasonable
avenue for habeas counsel to obtain documents to which trial counsel
126
was already legally entitled.” The events that led to the adoption of this
statute and the legislative history also demonstrate that the legislature
had the overarching goal of giving defendant-petitioners additional tools
127
to challenge convictions resulting from government misconduct.
The Barnett court alluded to several factors in support of imposing a
reasonable-basis requirement on defendant-petitioners seeking postconviction discovery. However, none of those reasons is consistent with
the context in which the legislation was adopted, the legislative history,
or California precedent. More importantly, the reasonable-basis
requirement is contrary to the plain language of the statute.

III. Effect of the Reasonable-Basis Requirement
In Barnett, the defendant-petitioner, amici curiae, and the lower
court all raised concerns that the reasonable-basis requirement would
make the discovery of previously undisclosed evidence to which a
128
defendant-petitioner was entitled under Steele virtually impossible. The
Barnett court was not bothered by this, having concluded that section
1054.9’s “purpose is to allow defendants to receive materials they have
129
reason to believe they are missing.” Despite the court’s rejection of this
concern, the practical result is that in many circumstances, defendantpetitioners will never have access to potentially exculpatory discovery
130
that they did not obtain at trial. In order to understand the impact that
Barnett will have on discovery requests that seek to obtain material for
the first time, it is helpful to address these requests based on specificity.
The specificity of these requests can be described using the following
categories: extrinsic-document identification, pattern-and-practice claims,
and preexisting duty.

125. In re Steele, 85 P.3d 444, 451 (Cal. 2004).
126. Cal. S. Rules Comm., Bill Analysis, S. 2002-1391, 2002 Sess., at 5.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 49–67.
128. See Barnett, 237 P.3d at 984–85; Mr. Barnett's Answer to Attorney General's Petition for
Review at 23, Barnett, 237 P.3d 980 (No. S150229), 2007 CA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3269, at *37; Brief of
Amicus Curiae Habeas Corpus Resource Center, supra note 111, at 39–40; Brief of Amicus Curiae
California Public Defenders’ Ass’n, supra note 117, at 15.
129. 237 P.3d at 985.
130. In other words, Barnett threatens discovery of the three Steele categories of evidence that
defendant did not receive at trial: evidence that the prosecution had a duty to disclose because of a
court order, statutory duty, or constitutional duty; evidence the prosecutor had a duty to disclose
because the defendant specifically asked for it; and evidence that the prosecution would have been
obligated to disclose had the defendant made a specific request. See supra text accompanying note 73.
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A. Extrinsic-Document Identification
In several situations, defendant-petitioners will have extrinsic
evidence that identifies additional discovery. The Barnett court identified
a number of cases of this type that involved internal cross-referencing of
131
the previously provided discovery and the trial record. If a police
report or a witness’s testimony at trial reveals that there were additional
reports or interviews not disclosed in discovery, this internal crossreference to an undisclosed document would be sufficient to meet the
132
reasonable-basis requirement.
Looking beyond the trial documents, independent habeas
investigation also may yield evidence in support of an identifyingevidence-based request. For example, attorneys and investigators
conducting additional investigation post-conviction may obtain a
declaration from a witness years after the conviction, stating that he
made exculpatory statements to the police that the discovery record
indicates were never disclosed at trial. An investigator may find records
from an unrelated case where an informant is impeached using deals or
information that the prosecution did not disclose at the defendantpetitioner’s trial. Though these examples are not specifically described by
the Barnett court, this type of evidence also identifies specific discovery
that the prosecution failed to disclose at trial despite the defendantpetitioner’s entitlement and would presumably meet the reasonable-basis
requirement.
Based on the Barnett court’s explicit endorsement of requests
substantiated by cross-reference, it seems as though all extrinsicdocument identification requests will satisfy the reasonable-basis
requirement and continue to be discoverable. This, then, is the only
category of discovery request likely to remain unchanged by Barnett.
B. Pattern-and-Practice Requests
There are times when a defendant-petitioner will lack identifying
evidence of the type described above but will strongly suspect that
additional discoverable evidence exists because of a known pattern or
practice of involved players or law enforcement. The pattern and
practice relied on may be newly discovered or long-standing.
The facts in Gonzalez present an example of a newly discovered
133
pattern and practice that supports a discovery request. After news
broke that the District Attorney had knowingly used the testimony of
unreliable informants in the Los Angeles County Jail during the period
relevant to his case, Gonzalez requested discovery relating to the
131. 237 P.3d at 985.
132. Id.
133. People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1203 (Cal. 1990).

Berndt_63-HLJ-780 (Do Not Delete)

946

3/26/2012 5:39 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:927

134

jailhouse informant who testified against him. Although Gonzalez had
no specific evidence that the prosecution possessed undisclosed
information tending to impeach or discredit the informant at the time of
his request, his suspicion was supported by the existence of a known
135
conspiracy that lasted ten years and that might have impacted his case.
In addition to newly discovered practices like those in Gonzalez,
long-standing patterns and practices may lead a defendant-petitioner to
believe that the prosecutor has certain evidence that would support the
defendant-petitioner’s theory of the case and undermine the prosecution’s
136
story. If the evidence was not so patently exculpatory that the
prosecutor would have been required to disclose it without a discovery
request from the defense, then the absence of a request in the trial file
raises the suspicion that undisclosed evidence may exist. Defendantpetitioners requesting this type of discovery cannot show that specific
documents within the category they are requesting actually exist (if they
could, their request would fall into the extrinsic-document identification
category). However, because there was no duty to disclose them at trial,
there is enhanced suspicion that such material might exist. Examples
include evidence that could be mitigating under a specific theory, but is
137
not inherently so; evidence regarding the prior record of a third party
otherwise unconnected to the case but whom the defense intends to
138
argue was the culpable party; and evidence of a police officer’s prior
139
misconduct in certain circumstances.
Such a scenario is illustrated by the Steele facts. For use in
mitigation, Steele sought records regarding his cooperation with prison
officials and law enforcement in their investigation and prosecution of
140
Law-enforcement pattern and
the Nuestra Familia prison gang.
practice suggested that this type of information was likely to be collected
in a prison file, which the prosecution reviewed in the course of its
investigation. Such evidence would be considered exculpatory under
Brady v. Maryland only if the defendant-petitioner put the prosecution
141
on notice of its mitigating value by specifically requesting it. Unlike
other requests for information not previously disclosed, there is no
implication of prosecutorial misconduct in Steele-type requests. Despite
this significant difference, the Barnett court appeared to treat a request

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. These are the kinds of requests described in the fourth Steele category. See supra notes 73–74
and accompanying text.
137. In re Steele, 85 P.3d 444, 456 (Cal. 2004).
138. Id. at 456 n.5.
139. See, e.g., Hurd v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893, 897 (Ct. App. 2006).
140. Steele, 85 P.3d at 447–48.
141. Id. at 456.

Berndt_63-HLJ-780 (Do Not Delete)

March 2012]

3/26/2012 5:39 PM

POST-CONVICTION DISCOVERY

947

like that in Steele the same as it would treat any other request beyond file
reconstruction—by subjecting it to the reasonable-basis requirement.
California appellate courts have not ruled on a pattern-and-practice
request in a section 1054.9 motion since Barnett, and Barnett’s language
shed little to no light on such cases. On the one hand, although patternand-practice requests involve enhanced suspicion, they do not find
support in the kind of direct extrinsic evidence present in the crossreference examples given in Barnett. On the other hand, Barnett did not
announce a definitive evidence standard; it announced a reasonable-basis
standard. The pattern and practice described in the Gonzalez case, as in
the cases that challenged convictions after the Rampart Scandal, involve
founded fears of government misconduct. Because evidence that is
frequently kept in the course of business is asked for in the first instance
in Steele-type requests, there is an enhanced likelihood that such
evidence may exist. Justice would be best served by granting these
requests; yet at best, Barnett leaves these requests in grey territory.
Lower courts can minimize the limiting effects of Barnett by interpreting
pattern-and-practice cases as meeting the reasonable-basis requirement.
C. Preexisting-Duty Requests
Each of the two previous categories involves a constitutional or
statutory duty and something more—some extra reason to believe that
undisclosed documents might exist. The preexisting-duty category, by
contrast, relies merely on the prosecutor’s duty to disclose certain
documents that existed at the time of trial. This kind of request yields
useful evidence only when a prosecutor’s file contains documents it failed
to disclose at trial despite a duty to do so, either intentionally or due to
oversight or confusion about the law.
Barnett itself contained an example of such an exclusion. Earlier in
the proceedings, Barnett had submitted a discovery request that
142
mirrored a discovery order entered at trial. In response, the prosecutor
produced police reports that had not been turned over pursuant to the
order, despite the fact that they had been in the trial prosecutor’s
143
possession. Had Barnett been required to make a showing that these
144
police reports existed, he would not have been able to do so.
The Barnett court’s decision will prevent courts from granting
discovery in response to these preexisting-duty requests based on the
presumption that government officers have properly performed their
145
duties.

142.
143.
144.
145.

Barnett v. Superior Court, 237 P.3d 980, 991 (Cal. 2010) (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 984 (majority opinion).
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In summary, although the language of section 1054.9 makes no
distinction between file-reconstruction requests and other requests for
information to which the defendant-petitioner would have been entitled
at trial, the Barnett decision does. It assesses requests for material that
the defendant-petitioner never received based on the specificity of the
request. Whether a defendant-petitioner obtains discovery depends on
whether his request is based on extrinsic evidence, pattern and practice,
or preexisting duty. The Barnett court explicitly approved of requests
that offer extrinsic evidence that a certain document has been in the
possession of the prosecution. On the other hand, it explicitly
disapproved of preexisting-duty requests and left uncertain the fate of
pattern-and-practice requests. The resulting risk is that some defendantpetitioners will not be able to identify prosecutors’ failure to disclose
evidence they had a duty to provide, and thus that credible habeas claims
will remain hidden. As stated by Justice Werdegar in her dissent, this
precedent calls out for “the Legislature to reassert its prerogative in
146
terms that cannot so easily be ignored.”

IV. Opportunities for New California Legislation
The California Supreme Court has, at the very least, undermined
the legislature’s goal of providing criminal defendants with the necessary
tools to identify and prove government misconduct. Properly interpreted,
section 1054.9 should allow defendant-petitioners a second opportunity
to ask for materials to that they were already entitled to receive at trial
but either had lost or never received. Even if California courts find that
pattern-and-practice requests satisfy the reasonable-basis requirement
set forth in Barnett, the court’s imposition of new barriers to discovery
for preexisting-duty-based requests threatens to deprive defendantpetitioners of a meaningful opportunity to identify government
misconduct and to challenge their convictions in state post-conviction
proceedings.
To address this judicial abrogation of legislative intent and to
provide defendant-petitioners with the tools that lawmakers intended,
the California legislature should heed Justice Werdegar’s call for
clarifying legislation. The simplest and most obvious way to do this
would be for the legislature to add a clarifying statute that rejects the
court’s Barnett decision and returns to a pre-Barnett meaning of section
1054.9.
Alternatively, the legislature might better promote both justice and
efficiency by adopting an open-file post-conviction discovery scheme.
Such a set of laws would eliminate the gatekeeper role of prosecutors,
thereby maximizing the ability of defendant-petitioners to identify and
146. Id. at 990 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
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prove government misconduct. The policy would also lower costs,
because it would reduce the need for the post-conviction investigation
now required to support more specific discovery requests without
creating additional work for prosecutors.
North Carolina has adopted an open-file discovery statute for postconviction use in death-penalty cases, which should be used as a model
147
for California. North Carolina’s law took effect in 1996 and applies
only to prisoners sentenced to death and pursuing a post-conviction
148
challenge to their conviction or sentence. As in California, the North
Carolina statute requires defense trial counsel to give its files to the
149
defendant for post-conviction challenge. The North Carolina law goes
further by also requiring the state to “make available to the defendant’s
counsel the complete files of all law-enforcement and prosecutorial
agencies involved in the investigation of the crimes committed or the
150
prosecution of the defendant.” If the state believes that the disclosure
of any portion of the files would not serve the “interest of justice,” it can
151
submit those portions to the court for review. The court may allow the
state to withhold those portions only if the files “could not assist the
capital defendant in investigating, preparing, or presenting a motion for
152
appropriate relief.”
A California statute providing open-file discovery for defendantpetitioners raising collateral challenges to death and life without parole
sentences, similar to the statute implemented for death-penalty cases in
153
North Carolina, would promote justice and fairness. The language

147. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1415(f) (2010) provides:
In the case of a defendant who is represented by counsel in postconviction proceedings in
superior court, the defendant’s prior trial or appellate counsel shall make available to the
defendant’s counsel their complete files relating to the case of the defendant. The State, to
the extent allowed by law, shall make available to the defendant’s counsel the complete files
of all law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies involved in the investigation of the crimes
committed or the prosecution of the defendant. If the State has a reasonable belief that
allowing inspection of any portion of the files by counsel for the defendant would not be in
the interest of justice, the State may submit for inspection by the court those portions of the
files so identified. If upon examination of the files, the court finds that the files could not
assist the defendant in investigating, preparing, or presenting a motion for appropriate
relief, the court in its discretion may allow the State to withhold that portion of the files.
148. See id. § 15A-1415(a)–(b).
149. Compare Rose v. State Bar, 779 P.2d 761, 765 (Cal. 1989), with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A1415(f).
150. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1415(f).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. As a result of the lessons revealed by North Carolina’s post-conviction discovery provisions in
capital cases, the state elected to adopt open-file pretrial discovery in all felony cases. Robert P.
Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical
Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 257, 272–76 (2008). Changes to
pretrial criminal discovery in California would require either a two-thirds vote of the legislature or a
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should parallel that of the North Carolina statute, including the
allowance of access to prosecutorial and law-enforcement files. It also
should specifically include post-conviction access to the personnel files of
law-enforcement officers as allowed pretrial by the California Evidence
154
Code in order to identify police misconduct.
Open-file discovery is likely to reveal the prosecution’s failure to
155
disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant at trial. Intentional and
inadvertent failure to disclose information in violation of a prosecutor’s
duty is a significant problem, although it is currently difficult to
156
diagnose. Although the U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari in only
one percent of all petitions that pass before it, it has ruled on a case
involving Brady violations at least once each decade since the Brady
157
decision in 1963. A review of California cases raising Brady claims
specifically found that exculpatory information had been improperly
withheld in 129 cases, and the failures to disclose were found material
158
and reversible in sixteen of those cases. The results in North Carolina
after the implementation of open-file discovery in capital cases
demonstrate that open-file discovery does reveal Brady violations. From
the time North Carolina’s statute was passed in 1995 to 2004, seven
159
death-row prisoners were granted relief based on Brady violations.

voter initiative, whereas changes to post-conviction discovery can be passed by a simple majority of
the legislature. See People v. Superior Court, 227 P.3d 858, 860–61 (Cal. 2010) (holding that
Proposition 115 placed limits on the legislature’s ability to address pretrial discovery, but not postconviction discovery). It is because of this distinction that this Note advocates for changes to postconviction, rather than pretrial, discovery.
154. See Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1043–1047 (2011) (describing circumstances in which criminal
defendants can discover law-enforcement personnel files); see also Pitchess v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d
305, 309 (Cal. 1974) (finding the defendant’s request for materials about prior complaints against a
police officer were relevant to his self-defense to battery charges and discoverable for purposes of
obtaining prior statements of unavailable witnesses, refreshing witness memory, and proving the
character of the police officer). Pitchess materials have been considered within the category of
information to which the defendant would have been entitled at trial had he requested it, and
therefore discoverable under section 1054.9. Hurd v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893, 897 (Ct.
App. 2006).
155. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
156. See Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. Tex. L. Rev. 685, 686–88
(2006) (describing both the high number of appellate cases raising claims of Brady error and how
Brady evidence hidden by the prosecution “may never be discovered”).
157. Maitri Klinkosum & Brad Bannon, Advocating for Those Left Behind: The Need for
Discovery Reform in Non-Capital Post-Conviction Cases, Trial Briefs, Feb. 2005, at 8.
158. Cal. Comm’n on the Fair Admin. of Justice, Final Report 70 n.2 (2008) (describing the
results of a study conducted for the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice by
Cookie Ridolfi, a law professor at Santa Clara University and the Executive Director of the Northern
California Innocence Project).
159. Klinkosum & Bannon, supra note 157, at 10.
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Ineffective assistance of defense counsel also can be revealed
160
In California, ineffective
through an open-file discovery system.
assistance of counsel claims comprised the largest percentage of
161
successful claims in death-penalty cases from 1977 to 2005, further
emphasizing the importance of enabling the pursuit of these claims. By
allowing defendant-petitioners to review prosecution files for materials
to which the defense would have been entitled only upon request, the
defense will be able to ascertain whether trial counsel was deficient by
failing to request certain types of discovery.
Take, for instance, the case of Javier Ovando, whom police officers
from the Rampart Division shot and then framed for assault and
162
brandishing a firearm against a police officer. Fortunately for Ovando,
one of the police officers confessed to the true course of events and the
163
District Attorney filed a writ for Ovando’s release. However, a
hypothetical derived from Ovando’s case is an instructive example of the
potential effectiveness of the proposed legislation. If the offending
officer had never come forward, and if Ovando had access to open-file
discovery to file his habeas claim, his habeas attorney could have
requested and received information from the personnel files of the two
164
officers that were involved in the shooting. Such a request would have
made sense based on Ovando’s version of events and may have led to
evidence that would have discredited the police officers or revealed
patterns of misconduct.
Ovando filed a malpractice claim against the county and his public
165
and the results suggest that his attorney’s inadequate
defender,
representation may have been substantial enough for him to prevail
under the Strickland test on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Ovando won a $6.5 million jury verdict for malpractice based on his
claims that his attorney “failed to adequately investigate the facts and
circumstances of his alleged crimes, failed to adequately investigate the
backgrounds of Officers Perez and Durden, and failed to undertake

160. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel includes the right to competent and effective assistance of counsel); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that petitioners seeking post-conviction relief because
of ineffective assistance of counsel must prove that the trial attorney’s performance fell substantially
below professional standards and resulted in prejudice to the defendant).
161. Cal. Comm’n on the Fair Admin. of Justice, supra note 158, at 125.
162. Ovando v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 415, 420 (Ct. App. 2008). Though Mr.
Ovando did not receive a sentence severe enough to entitle him to post-conviction discovery under the
current or proposed legislation, his circumstances are still instructive.
163. Id. at 420–21.
164. See Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1043–47 (2011).
165. Ovando, 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 422.
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reasonable measures to locate and present the testimony at trial of
166
percipient witnesses who could have exonerated Ovando.”
Perhaps most important, open-file discovery will allow defendants
who suspect they have been the victims of police misconduct to review
law-enforcement materials with a critical eye in light of new information.
167
This would allow defendant-petitioners such as Gonzalez to review
168
law-enforcement files on the informant used against him. Ovando
would have been able to request the records of the officers who shot and
framed him for assault and brandishing a weapon and to review the
prosecutor’s files for any evidence that could prove things happened the
way he said they did.
Not only would open-file discovery promote the presentation of
claims necessary to the pursuit of justice, it would be a particularly
efficient means of doing so. Because defendants would no longer have to
find independent evidence that materials exist, as they currently do
under Barnett, open-file discovery would reduce the time and money
spent on defense investigation of issues that would be addressed by a
review of the prosecution and law-enforcement files. Also, because the
prosecution would be providing all of its files to the defense, open-file
discovery would save the prosecution the time of culling through a case
file for information to which the defendant would be entitled. Finally, the
criminal legal system would be freed from the additional litigation caused
by disputes regarding whether or not a defendant would have been
entitled to discovery at trial and whether the defendant-petitioner can
meet the reasonable-basis requirement.

Conclusion
The California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Barnett v.
Superior Court stands to dramatically limit defendant-petitioners’ ability
to use section 1054.9 of the California Penal Code as a tool to uncover
evidence of government misconduct. But the court’s holding is contrary
to California lawmakers’ intentions for creating the law. In light of the
clandestine nature of government misconduct and the recent and
ongoing scandals in law-enforcement offices, the Barnett decision is likely
to perpetuate the concealment of evidence of government misconduct. A
legislative intervention is needed both to restore and to further expand
defense discovery rights in California. A state law for open-file discovery
in post-conviction proceedings would provide a cost-effective means of
promoting greater justice in cases involving government misconduct.

166. Id.
167. See supra notes 30–41.
168. See supra notes 162–66.

